{"id":93,"date":"2022-05-25T16:25:00","date_gmt":"2022-05-25T13:25:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/?p=93"},"modified":"2022-05-30T16:29:35","modified_gmt":"2022-05-30T13:29:35","slug":"russias-military-telegrams-its-discontent","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/new-nobility\/russias-military-telegrams-its-discontent\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia\u2019s Military Telegrams its Discontent"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>By May, the entire Russian army had begun to feel the strain of the war. The\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.forbes.com\/sites\/davidaxe\/2022\/05\/23\/up-to-15000-russians-have-died-in-ukraine\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">high casualties<\/a>\u00a0sustained by the troops, and the fact that the best units were already deployed in Ukraine, became the hot topic of conversation not only among the liberals and journalists, but among the military too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The May 9 Victory Day parade on Red Square figured extensively in those conversations \u2013 not only because Vladimir Putin shunned the opportunity to swell the military\u2019s ranks through mobilization, as many expected, but because of the way the parade was conducted. Most observers noticed the absence of the Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov in the group of high-ranking attendees around Putin. Military professionals noticed something else too: the absence of numerous other generals from the parade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Russian military parades have been conducted on Red Square in more or less the same way since Stalin\u2019s days \u2013 the key element is always a column of dozens of so-called parade units representing\u202fmarching across Red Square to represent all branches of\u202fthe\u202farmed forces and other\u202fsecurity\u202fagencies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These parade units march in square formations \u2013 ten rows\u202fof soldiers\u202fin ceremonial dress\u202fled by a commanding officer charged with keeping the appropriate distance between the formations. And indeed, when the formations representing Russian military academies marched, the generals did indeed proudly march at their head.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But when the regular troops appeared, like the elite Kantemirovskaya and Tamanskaya divisions, they were led by lieutenant-colonels, not their general officers. And when it came to the tanks, a high point of every parade, it fell to senior lieutenants to lead units growling across Red Square.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The change was as clear as daylight to the military and understandably they had the urge to discuss what they had seen. But where to have these sensitive conversations?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Russian army has always been shrouded in extreme secrecy, except for that brief period of the 1990s when the media enjoyed relative freedom. When Sergey Shoigu became Defense Minister 10 years ago, he tightened the secrecy rules still more (He\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.mk.ru\/politics\/2019\/09\/22\/sergey-shoygu-rasskazal-kak-spasali-rossiyskuyu-armiyu.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">proudly told<\/a>\u00a0an interviewer in 2019 that he had not spoken to a journalist in seven years.) There is no parliamentary oversight over military spending, and the minister and his generals don\u2019t need to respond to deputies\u2019 inquiries about what is going on with the military. Shoigu also resurrected the Soviet Main Political Department, which in Soviet times had overseen the brainwashing of soldiers in Communist ideology. These days its duty is to oppose Western attempts to undermine the fighting spirit of the Russian Army \u2013 and Shoigu believed that journalists\u2019 inquiries about casualties could be so described. Thus, any military-related conversation not sanctioned by the Defense Ministry is considered a\u202fstate\u202fcrime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Russia\u2019s military professionals couldn\u2019t talk about their problems in the media, given that the\u202flaw on state secrecy has been changed so as to ban\u202fjournalists from writing about the army\u2019s problems. And Shoigu had\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.mk.ru\/politics\/2019\/09\/22\/sergey-shoygu-rasskazal-kak-spasali-rossiyskuyu-armiyu.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">personally forbidden<\/a>\u00a0the media from covering the deaths of special forces officers and troopers, or talking to the relatives of those killed on the battlefield.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This system of complete cover-up might be sustainable in peacetime, but it cannot survive the head on clash with the reality of a full-scale war. The risible coverage of the conflict has destroyed any remaining credibility the pro-Kremlin media might have had \u2014 and not only among liberal society, but also with the military, which knows better than most the true price of war in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A\u202fpro-war channel\u202faffiliated with the Russian military\u202fon Telegram\u202frecently conducted a poll among subscribers (mostly serving military personnel and veterans). Astonishingly, only\u202f2% said\u202fthey trust\u202fRussian\u202f media as a source of information about the officially named special military operation. Intriguingly, 38% said they rely on bloggers as a primary source.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>And that mostly means reliance on writers using Telegram channels. Russia\u2019s newly introduced and extremely punitive information legislation makes it a crime for anyone to refer to the war as a war. Any reference to the Kremlin\u2019s operation must quote official sources, and that prohibition extends to the military.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Yet the truth of Russian defeat outside Kyiv was clear to anyone who had been close to the battles, or who had spoken to a participant. Soldiers and their officers\u202fbegan to\u202fturn to\u202fTelegram channels as the only space available to talk about the problems with the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The app, mostly\u202fknown in the West as a messenger with Russian ownership, has a disproportionately significant role in Russian society \u2014 it is the most popular mass media in the country. Telegram allows everyone to open a channel and post any information or video, uncensored, and mostly unverified, and can be set to allow feedback from readers.\u202fIn a country where the authorities have long been shut off from the public and decisions made in complete secrecy, telegram channels provide a sort of keyhole \u2014 many channels pretend to be run by anonymous \u201cinsiders\u201d \u2014 into the Kremlin, or security services. They serve much the same role as rumors and gossip during the Soviet era \u2014satisfying the desperate demand for information (while not necessarily being true.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>When the war started, new voices emerged on Telegram. Along with independent media, which launched channels to reach an audience denied them by Russian law, army veterans were also noticeable. Military circles, always distrustful of liberal media, chose to avoid journalist middlemen and women, and only to trust their own when discussing what was really happening on the battlefield. Many of these voices are not completely anonymous \u2013 the military knows who is behind them, and that acceptance boosts their credibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>So when those channels said that the air defenses of the Ukrainian army were still very much operational, it caused serious soul searching within the air force. It works both ways \u2013 a relatively honest debate about the problems encountered by the military prompted an emergence of military-civic activities \u2013 the channels first reported shortages of equipment and then started crowdfunding for radios, medicine, body armor, or\u202fnight-vision devices. That, in turn, prompted the audience of those channels to ask why the Ministry was incapable of supplying the army with much-needed equipment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This new civic activity in military circles is developing in unexpected ways \u2014 when the channels urged their subscribers not to talk about the casualties suffered by the army in its\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/news\/world-europe-61399440\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">disastrous attempt<\/a>\u00a0to cross the Siversky Donets River, and to postpone the discussion until after the war, subscribers were furious.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In three months of the war, something completely unprecedented has emerged \u2013 a space for debate\u202fwithin the Russian army, uncensored, and beyond the control of the\u202fMinistry of Defense. That space is mostly manned by trusted, hardened veterans, many with the rank of major or lieutenant-colonel, no higher. Don\u2019t be misled \u2013 these are not peaceniks in the making. If they criticize the army and the Kremlin, they do so from more radical positions. For instance, both audience and authors of military Telegram channels have demanded that the Ukrainians captured after 82 days defending the Azovstal steelworks in Mariupol should be tried and executed, not swapped for Russian prisoners of war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But despite their radical, pro-war discourse, such unauthorized activity will not be welcome to the regime. It puts an additional burden on the military command, and opens the way to the sort of unsanctioned activities by trained and uniformed men that can only foster unease among the authors of war in the Kremlin.\u202f<\/p>\n\n\n<p class=\"shortcode-small-text_bold\">Agentura.ru  2022<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Russian troops are using social media channels to discuss the war, despite potentially punitive punishments. The Kremlin won\u2019t like it.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":94,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-93","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-new-nobility"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/93","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=93"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/93\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":97,"href":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/93\/revisions\/97"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/94"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=93"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=93"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=93"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}