{"id":279,"date":"2024-05-14T15:09:33","date_gmt":"2024-05-14T12:09:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/?p=279"},"modified":"2024-07-16T15:14:18","modified_gmt":"2024-07-16T12:14:18","slug":"export-of-cyber-paranoia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/agentura.co.uk\/en\/new-nobility\/export-of-cyber-paranoia\/","title":{"rendered":"Export of the cyber-Paranoia"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

By Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan\u00a0<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The day Putin was sworn in at the Kremlin, he signed the Executive Order on Russian development goals to 2036. Among the many promises was \u201censuring Internet sovereignty and information security in the Russian Internet.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s clear what that means: Putin has been absolutely consistent in what he expects from national information security and has shown just how much he cares about the issue \u2014 he signed his first Doctrine of Information Security as early as 2000. In essence, this means the isolation of the Russian information space \u2014 which includes media and all kinds of communication \u2014 from the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ever since 2000, the Kremlin has been constantly and consistently expanding the areas that had to be protected from the West \u2014 the May 8 Executive Order, for instance, bans video games that \u201cdistort\u201d Russian history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This approach is easier to grasp once it\u2019s understood that the West is seen by Putin and his regime as a biolab-producing mind virus liable to infect the Russian people. It is therefore an existential issue for an autocratic government to prevent Western media, Western technologies, Western ideas, and Western social media from influencing Russian public opinion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Only in this way can the regime hope to ensure its survival. In most countries, this is the primary task of the secret police.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Kremlin can now boast years of experience in such work in an increasingly challenging global environment, which puts it in a good position to successfully sell this experience elsewhere in the world. By expanding the reach of the Russian regime through intelligence service supply, it may also hope to emulate the mercenary model of the former Wagner Group, which has extended Russia\u2019s military reach and kleptocratic business model<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two weeks before Putin\u2019s inauguration, the Russian Security Council convened a major conference in St Petersburg \u2014 The 12th<\/sup> International Meeting of High-Ranking Officials Responsible for Security Matters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Organized by Nikolai Patrushev (the head of the Security Council until May 12, when he was shuffled aside<\/a>), this was the latest in a series of meetings since 2010 designed to boost Russian intelligence and security agencies\u2019 exports to friendly nations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The conferences court high-ranking security officials of the target countries, especially heads of national security councils, national security advisers, deputy prime ministers, and heads of security and intelligence agencies. This year, the conference gathered security mandarins from 106 countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cuba, Sudan, Syria, Brazil, Bolivia, Thailand, Kazakhstan, many African countries, and many in the Middle East, sent their security supremos to St Petersburg.\u00a0\u00a0 <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There were two key topics \u2014 information security, and protection of traditional values\/national identity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patrushev, displaying his trademark disdain for subtlety, openly advertised Russian cyber companies to the participants. He listed seven firms:<\/p>\n\n\n\n